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ABSTRACT
Crowdsourcing platforms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk
and Google Consumer Surveys can profile users based on
their inputs to online surveys. In this work we first demon-
strate how easily user privacy can be compromised by collat-
ing information from multiple surveys. We then propose, de-
velop, and evaluate a crowdsourcing survey platform called
Loki that allows users to control their privacy loss via at-
source obfuscation.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: Security and Protection; C.2.4 [Computer-
Communication Networks]: Distributed Systems
Keywords
Privacy; Surveys; Obfuscation
1. INTRODUCTION
Academic and market researchers are increasingly using
online platforms for crowdsourcing sruvey information from
online users. For example, the Amazon Mechanical Turk
(AMT) platform [1] pays volunteers to take surveys, while
the Google Consumer Surveys platform [7] restricts user ac-
cess to premium content via a “surveywall”. Users partici-
pating in either system can lose privacy with each personal
fact or opinion that they reveal in the course of the surveys
they participate in. This privacy loss can accumulate over
time, with potential social and legal consequences for the
users.
Our first contribution is to show that an entity can easily
use an existing crowdsourcing platform (AMT in our case)
to de-anonymize users and obtain sensitive private informa-
tion, in a short time at very low cost, by correlating re-
sponses across multiple surveys. Our second contribution
is to design, prototype, and evaluate an alternative crowd-
sourcing platform that allows users to obfuscate their an-
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swers at-source to control their privacy loss without hav-
ing to trust any external entity. All user experiments un-
dertaken in this work were conducted with ethics approval
(number 08/2013/19) obtained from the UNSW Human Re-
search Ethics Advisory Panel ‘H’.
2. EXPOSING PRIVACY LOSS
To illustrate how easily privacy is compromised in a crowd-
sourcing platform, we launched the following series of survey
tasks in AMT (launched through a third-party aggregator
called CrowdFlower [3]):
1. The first survey queried users for their opinions on
astrology services, and in the process obtained their
star-sign and day/month of birth.
2. In the second survey we conducted a market research of
online match-making services, and obtained the users’
gender and year of birth.
3. In the third survey we asked about mobile phone cov-
erage and obtained users’ zip code information.
We designed our surveys with sufficient redundancy to help
us identify and filter out users who gave random responses.
Further, these surveys were posted independently over sev-
eral days, and users were unlikely to have known that they
were conducted by the same entity. Note that although
AMT does not reveal the name or personal details of any
user, it reports back to the surveyor a unique ID that is
constant across the surveys taken by a user. We therefore
had the potential ability to identify users who took all the
three surveys above, and de-anonymize them using their
date of birth, gender, and zip code (previous studies [11,
6] have shown the effectiveness of using these attributes in
re-identification of individuals).
We then launched a fourth survey asking users to anony-
mously tell us about their smoking habits and coughing fre-
quency. Of the 400 unique users who took our surveys, 72
could be de-anonymized from the first three surveys, and we
could infer the respiratory health (and likelihood of tuber-
culosis) for 18 of these de-anonymized individuals from the
fourth survey using their unique ID, resulting in a serious
breach of privacy. Our experiment took only a few days and
cost less than $30; we can only imagine what the scale of
privacy loss could be, were this experiment to be conducted
by entities with larger resources.
We followed up the above experiment with another survey
in which we asked users if they would participate if they
knew they could be de-anonymized and profiled. Out of
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(a) Surveys (b) Questions (c) Responses
Figure 1: Screenshots of iPhone App showing (a) list
of surveys and choice of privacy levels, (b) ratings-
based questions , and (c) obfuscated user responses.
100 users who took this survey, 73 (including 15 of the 18
users above whose respiratory health could potentially be de-
anonymized) responded that they did not know they could
be profiled, and indicated that they would not participate
if they knew they were being profiled. Our experiments
illustrate that users can be profiled easily and at low cost,
despite their disapproval of such practices.
3. SOLUTION DESIGN AND RESULTS
3.1 Solution Approach
Unlike prior approaches that rely on anonymization (that
can be circumvented [9, 10]) or trusted third-parties [2, 8],
we believe that the best entity to control privacy loss is the
user. We therefore designed an (iOS and Android) app that
allows users to choose their level of privacy for each survey
(Fig. 1(a) shows our app interface with an option of none,
low, medium, or high privacy), respond to the survey ques-
tions as usual (as a first step we focus only on ratings-based
questions as shown in Fig 1(b)), and have the app obfus-
cate their responses prior to uploading them to the server
(Fig. 1(c) shows the obfuscated ratings that are reported).
Our obfuscation method adds Gaussian noise to the user’s
true response, with standard deviation successively larger for
higher privacy level chosen by the user. We note that the
underlying method of adding noise is general and can be ap-
plied to other question types (e.g., multiple-choice questions)
in which the response set is countable (this excludes free-text
responses). We have also developed a mathematical frame-
work (not discussed in this paper), relying on differential-
privacy [4, 5] to quantify the privacy loss, so that the cumu-
lative privacy loss can be tracked and balanced across the
user base, while ensuring sufficient accuracy of the aggre-
gated response.
3.2 Preliminary Results
We built a prototype of our crowdsourcing survey plat-
form, called Loki, including the front-end iPhone/iPad and
Android apps, and a back-end database/ server built in
Django framework (see project web-site: http://loki.eng.
unsw.edu.au/). We trialled the system with 131 volunteers
from our University, by launching a survey asking them to
rate various lecturers, as shown in screen-shots in Fig. 1.
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Figure 2: Variation in mean across the bins for var-
ious lecturers
We evaluated the success of our solution in two ways: (a)
whether it meets user expectations of privacy, and (b) whether
the results obtained are sufficiently accurate in spite of the
obfuscation.
User perception: We talked to each participant imme-
diately after the survey; most participants said that they
liked the way we presented privacy options (four easy-to-
understand levels), could easily see how the mechanism op-
erated (i.e., the privacy level corresponds to the magnitude
of Gaussian noise), and felt comfortable that their privacy
was protected when they saw their noisy responses. Of the
131 students who took the survey, we found that 18 chose
no privacy, 32 chose low privacy, 51 chose medium privacy,
and 30 chose high privacy setting. We conjecture that the
medium level was chosen by most users since they perceived
it as a “safer” option than the extreme values.
Accuracy: We validated the accuracy of the responses
using two methods – by comparing to the university-run
rating mechanism (which uses a trusted third party), and
by comparing the ratings across the various privacy bins in
our system. Though the university does not publicly reveal
the ratings of lecturers, we were able to verify that the small
handful that were privately revealed to the authors of this
paper corroborated well with those obtained from our sys-
tem. For example, one author obtained an average score
of 4.72 based on the noisy responses, only slightly higher
than the average rating of 4.61 (out of 5) he has received
from the (trusted third-party) university system over the
past 3 years. To validate accuracy across the privacy bins,
we plot in Fig. 2 the difference between the mean rating ob-
tained from a given privacy bin and the overall mean rating.
The figure also shows a histogram of the number of stu-
dents rating each lecturer per privacy bin. Unsurprisingly,
the accuracy of the estimated lecturer mean rating is lower
when fewer users are assigned to the bin, particularly for
higher privacy bins. This trade-off between accuracy and
privacy is inevitable, but our study shows that even with a
relatively small sample size the error is sufficiently small to
make inferences.
4. CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated that current online platforms for
crowdsourcing survey information allow user privacy to be
easily compromised. We developed a new system that uses
at-source obfuscation to empower users to control their pri-
vacy loss, while still yielding sufficiently accurate outcomes.
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